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UNITED STATES V. DUSENBERY: SUPREME COURT
SILENCE AND THE LINGERING ECHO OF DUE PROCESS
VIOLATIONS IN CIVIL FORFEITURE ACTIONS
DAVID F. BENSON*
INTRODUCTION
Civil forfeiture, is a statutory tool created to ensure that indi-
viduals do not profit from crime, 2 whereby all property substantially
connected to illegal activity is forfeited to the federal government
("government"). 3 This practice extends to nearly every area of the
law,4 but is most commonly associated with drug trafficking.' Accord-
ingly, today civil forfeiture is an integral part of our criminal justice
system,6 as the government uses proceeds from such actions to help
finance the war on drugs7 and to build new prisons.8
* J.D. candidate. Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2003;
B.S., Human and Organizational Development, Vanderbilt University, 1999. I would like to
thank Kelly Neff for her valuable assistance and comments. The Chicago-Kent Law Review
selected this Comment as the Best Case Comment from the 2001 Summer Candidacy Program.
Each summer, the Law Review invites students to participate in a vigorous ten-day, limited
page, closed-research writing program. The Law Review then selects new members from the
program based on writing ability. The 2001-2002 Editorial Board voted Mr. Benson's
Comment, United States v. Dusenbery: Supreme Court Silence and the Lingering Echo of Due
Process Violations in Civil Forfeiture Actions, as the best Case Comment based on its insightful
analysis and effective organization.
1. This Comment addresses civil forfeiture in the context of 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994). For
an overview of the numerous other civil forfeiture statutes governing nearly all areas of the law,
consult infra note 2.
2. David Pimentel, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, 6
(1999).
3. See United States v. A Single Family Residence located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d
625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he government is not required to show property is owned by drug
trafficker, but rather that it has a substantial connection to a drug transaction.").
4. See Pimentel, supra note 2, at app. A (listing 165 examples of property subject to civil
forfeiture in areas of the law ranging from agriculture to intellectual property to wildlife
resources).
5. See id. at 13. For example, under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a), nearly everything associated with
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of illegal drugs can be forfeited to the government,
including firearms, money, cars, and homes. See id. at 7.
6. Shannon T. Noya, Comment, Hoisted by Their Own Petard: Adverse Inferences in Civil
Forfeiture, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 493, 493 n.4 (1996) (quoting UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DIVISION, ASSET FORFEITURE OFFICE, FORFEITURES
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Seeing that filings of civil forfeiture cases are expected to in-
crease,9 the Supreme Court recently attempted to provide the circuits
with guidance on this issue, directing that all defendants in such cases
"must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
[g]overnment deprives them of property." 10 While this instruction has
clarified one aspect of civil forfeiture claims, the Court did not
determine how to resolve cases in which due process has been vio-
lated because the defendant did not receive proper notice of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding and the statute of limitations for
filing a judicial forfeiture action expired before the government
became aware of this fact."
This was precisely the question presented before the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Dusenbery.1" With limited case law available
on the issue, 13 the Dusenbery court concluded that the proper remedy
was to restore the right that a timely Rule 41(e) motion under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 41(e) motion") 14 would
have provided- "the right to judicially contest the forfeiture and to
put the [g]overnment to its proofs under a probable cause standard."' 5
VOLUME I: INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL STATUTES V (1984) ("'[Civil] forfeiture has become one
of the primary law enforcement tools' because it is a "powerful" weapon against crime."')).
7. Id. at 493-94.
8. Id. at 493 n.6 (citing Arthur W. Leach & John W. Malcolm, Criminal Forfeiture: An
Appropriate Solution to the Civil Forfeiture Debate, 10 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 251 nn.37-38
(1994)).
9. Pimentel, supra note 2, at 3.
10. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993). Notably, the
Supreme Court concluded that the adequacy of such notice is determined under the Mullane
test of "reasonableness under the circumstances." Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,
122 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2002) (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950)). For a detailed explanation of this case, see infra note 45.
11. The circuits apparently agree that if the defendant does not receive proper notice, and
the government becomes aware of this fact prior to the running of the statute of limitations, the
government may "correct its error and.., commence a judicial forfeiture proceeding." United
States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86, 88 (8th Cir. 1996).
12. 201 F.3d 763, 766 (6th Cir. 2000) (defining the issue before the court as: "What is the
proper remedy for a due process violation in an administrative forfeiture proceeding when the
statute of limitations for filing a judicial forfeiture action has expired?").
13. The Dusenbery court acknowledged that only three other circuits had previously ruled
on this issue. Id. See United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1999); Clymore v. United
States, 164 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1999); Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301 (2d Cir. 1997).
14. The relevant portion of Rule 41(e) states that "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district
in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that such person is
entitled to lawful possession of the property." To be timely, a Rule 41(e) motion must be filed
within six years from the time the property was forfeited. Marolf, 173 F.3d at 1220 n.1 (Rymer,
J., concurring).
15. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 768.
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Part I of this Comment details the procedures and judicial history
of civil forfeiture necessary to analyze the Dusenbery decision.
Specifically, this section discusses the four scenarios that may result in
a civil forfeiture proceeding, and examines the rulings and reasoning
adopted by other circuits leading up to this case. Part II presents the
facts of Dusenbery, details the procedural posture of this case, and
evaluates the Sixth Circuit's application of the law to these facts. Part
III inquires into the Dusenbery court's rationale supporting the
majority's holding, and suggests that, based upon better reasoned
case law, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and
reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding by endorsing the Dusenbery
dissent's logic. 16
I. CIVIL FORFEITURE: PROCEDURES AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
The government is statutorily required to commence all civil for-
feiture actions "within five years after the time when the alleged
offense was discovered."17 Such actions begin when the government
seizes the property in question.18 Within sixty days of this seizure, the
government must provide all interested parties written notice of its
intent to forfeit. 19 The interested parties are then given twenty days
from the time of notice to contest the forfeiture.20 If the parties fail to
16. The Supreme Court has indicated that it may be necessary, "in an appropriate case," to
reevaluate this area of civil forfeiture, given the current practice under 21 U.S.C. § 881. United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 82 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Interestingly,
while Dusenbery appeared to be such an "appropriate" case, as it not only demonstrates the
current practice under § 881, but also highlights the current conflict between the circuits
regarding the relationship between the due process notice requirement and the statute of
limitations in civil forfeiture cases, the Supreme Court denied Dusenbery's petition for writ of
certiorari on October 10, 2000. Dusenbery v. United States, 531 U.S. 925 (2000).
17. Marolf, 173 F.3d at 1215. Although Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 881 to give the
government the power of forfeiture in drug related offenses, the procedures for such forfeitures
are found in the Tariff Act of 1930, which "permits 'administrative forfeitures' of property
valued $500,000 or less." United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 21
U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609).
18. See, e.g., Marolf, 173 F.3d at 1215 (fifty-five foot boat seized after investigation); Boero,
111 F.3d at 303 (wallet and currency seized upon arrest); United States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86,
87 (8th Cir. 1996) (drugs, firearm, and $19,996 seized upon arrest); Woodall, 12 F.3d at 792 (cash
seized during booking).
19. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 699 (2002) (citing Mullane
v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)) (noting that the government is
not required to provide actual notice to the interested parties; rather, the adequacy of such
notice is determined under the Mullane test of "reasonableness under the circumstances").
20. To properly contest an administrative civil forfeiture, an interested party must file a
claim with the government and attach "a cost bond... or a declaration of an inability to file the
cost bond." Boero, 111 F.3d at 304.
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contest, the property is administratively forfeited to the government.21
If the forfeiture is contested, however, the government is required to
refer the claim to the United States Attorney for the district where
the seizure occurred in order to commence judicial forfeiture pro-
ceedings. 22 During the judicial proceedings, the government need
only establish that probable cause exists to carry its burden of proof.
23
Once probable cause is shown, the claimant bears the burden to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the property is
not subject to forfeiture because either (1) the property is not related
to illegal drug activity or (2) the claimant is an innocent owner lacking
knowledge of the property's connection with the sale, manufacture,
or distribution of drugs.
24
In light of these procedural requirements, a civil forfeiture case
may progress in one of four manners, each requiring a unique resolu-
tion. First, if the government affords the interested parties sufficient
notice of the pending claim, commences the civil forfeiture action
within the five-year statute of limitations, and the interested parties
do not challenge the action, the property is administratively forfeited
without court involvement. 25 Second, if the government follows the
requisite procedures, and the interested parties contest the govern-
ment's claim, a district court judge must decide the case on its mer-
its.26 Third, if the interested parties contest where the government
21. Woodall, 12 F.3d at 793.
22. Boero, 111 F.3d at 304. As noted in Woodall, it is well established that "[jiudicial
review is a fundamental safeguard against government agencies and public officials who
wrongfully seize or hold a citizen's property." 12 F.3d at 793 (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S.
731, 738 (1947); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220-21 (1882)). Venue for such claims is
valid in "(1) the district in which the forfeiture 'accrues,' (2) the district where the property is
found, as well as, (3) any district into which the property is brought." Pimentel, supra note 2, at
12 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1395).
23. "Probable cause" requires only that the government have "reasonable ground for belief
of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof, but more than mere suspicion." United States
v. A Single Family Residence located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986)
(internal citations omitted). Because this determination is made in light of the "realities of
normal life," the government appears to experience little difficulty in establishing probable
cause. Id. (internal citations omitted).
24. Boero, 111 F.3d at 304-05.
25. Before arguing that the government violated his due process rights by failing to provide
adequate notice of its intent to forfeit, the defendant in Woodall had $1,811 administratively
forfeited. 12 F.3d at 792. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to determine if the defendant
had received proper notice, stating that if he was not apprised with sufficient notice, the
government could either return his property or start a judicial forfeiture proceeding in district
court. Id. at 795. The statute of limitations was not at issue in Woodall. See id. at 792.
26. The interested parties in A Single Family Residence followed this procedure, but were
unable to demonstrate, beyond a preponderance of the evidence, that the home in question was
not subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). 803 F.2d at 628-29.
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pursues a civil forfeiture action within the statutory time period,
without providing adequate notice, the government may "begin anew
and.., file forfeiture proceedings in district court. ' 27 The fourth
situation occurs when the government fails both to apprise the
interested parties of the pending civil forfeiture proceedings, and to
commence the action within the statute of limitations. This situation
is currently the cause of great disagreement among the circuits,
resulting in two views as to the proper remedy: (1) void the forfeiture,
thereby returning the property to the interested party regardless of
guilt, 28 or (2) grant a judicial hearing on the merits.2 9
On April 14, 1997, the Second Circuit became, arguably,30 the
first federal appellate court to rule on a civil forfeiture case involving
both insufficient notice and the running of the statute of limitations in
Boero v. Drug Enforcement Administration." In Boero, the defen-
dant "s[ought] the return of $1,799.46 in cash that was administra-
tively forfeited by the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") on
January 31, 1991," after being convicted under federal narcotics
laws.32 With the DEA admitting that it did not give Boero adequate
notice of its intent to forfeit his funds, the court concluded that Boero
was entitled to a hearing on the merits in district court.33 The court
failed to explicitly comment on the statute of limitations issue, stating
only that the district court should have determined the merits of the
forfeiture rather than "allow[] Boero to pursue an administrative
remedy, over five years from the date of the initial seizure, as if an
improper forfeiture had never occurred." 34
Nearly two years later, in Clymore v. United States, the Tenth
Circuit specifically addressed both the notice and statute of limita-
tions issues."5 There, after pleading guilty to marijuana charges,
Clymore filed a Rule 41(e) motion demanding the return of property
27. United States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86, 88 (8th Cir. 1996).
28. See United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1999); Clymore v. United States,
164 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1999).
29. See United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2000); Boero, 111 F.3d 301.
30. In his concurring opinion in Marolf, Judge Rymer questioned whether the Boero court
really addressed the statute of limitations issue in its holding, as she stated "[n]othing in Boero
suggests that the court actually considered and ruled on the import of the statute of limitations."
173 F.3d at 1221 (Rymer, J., concurring).
31. 111F.3dat301.
32. Id. at 303.
33. Id. at 307.
34. Id. at 305.
35. 164 F.3d 569 (10th Cir. 1999).
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forfeited to the government. 36 Clymore based his motion upon the
fact that he had not received sufficient notice concerning the govern-
ment's intent to forfeit and argued that the government was pre-
cluded from commencing judicial forfeiture proceedings because the
statute of limitations had expired.37 In ruling for Clymore, the court
concluded that (1) "a forfeiture accomplished without adequate
notice is void and must be vacated" and (2) "the statute of limita-
tions.., should be... allowed to operate, subject, of course, to any
available government arguments against it.''38
With the Circuits now split, the Ninth Circuit was next to decide
this issue in United States v. Marolf.39 The DEA seized Marolf's fifty-
five foot boat on July 12, 1991, during a marijuana smuggling investi-
gation, but failed to send him notice of the seizure, despite knowing
that he was the vessel's actual owner.40 On May 18, 1992, Marolf pled
guilty to marijuana charges, and was sentenced to prison.41 Marolf
filed a Rule 41(e) motion on December 2, 1996, requesting the
monetary equivalent of his boat, relying on the fact that he had not
been given adequate notice of the government's intent to forfeit.42
Recognizing that the statute of limitations expired on July 11, 1996,
43
the court followed the Clymore court's rationale by concluding that
(1) the administrative forfeiture was void because Marolf did not
receive proper notice, and (2) the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions prevented the government from initiating forfeiture proceed-
ings.44
36. Id. at 570. Specifically, Clymore sought the return of nine items of property, including:
(1) a 1990 Honda Accord; (2) a Cessna TU 206 aircraft; (3) a 1988 Ford truck; (4) $2,000 in
United States currency; (5) a second Cessna TU 206 aircraft; (6) another $4,510 in United States
currency; (7) approximately three million Mexican pesos; (8) an ICOM portable transceiver;
and (9) a battery pack for the transceiver. Id. at 571-72.
37. Id. at 572.
38. Id. at 574.
39. 173 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1999).
40. Id. at 1215.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1215-16. The parties agreed that the government had sold Marolf's boat; thus it
was impossible for the government to return the actual property. Id. at 1216. Accordingly, the
proper remedy was to compensate Marolf for his loss, which, in this case, was the monetary
value of his boat. See id. at 1220.
43. Id. at 1215.
44. Id.
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II. UNITED STATES V. DUSENBERY
A. Facts
Larry Dean Dusenbery was convicted for possessing and distrib-
uting cocaine in 1986.41 While incarcerated, he continued to supervise
his cocaine distribution network, which lead to a "1994 conviction for
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. ' '46 In connection with
Dusenbery's 1994 conviction, the government administratively
forfeited cash and checks totaling $119,568.90 and two automobiles at
various times between 1990 and 1992.47 On July 10, 1996, Dusenbery
moved for the return of this personal property, claiming that the
government failed to provide adequate notice of its intent to forfeit
his belongings."' Notably, in his Rule 41(e) motion, Dusenbery did
not claim "that the statute of limitations had already expired when
the [g]overnment sent the allegedly defective notices. ' '49
45. United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 764 (6th Cir. 2000). "In connection with this
conviction, the [g]overnment obtained civil forfeiture of several items of Dusenbery's property,
including $21,940.00 in U.S. Currency and a 1984 Chevrolet Monte Carlo." Id. at n.1. In an
action separate from the instant case, Dusenbery contested this first civil forfeiture action in
1996 on the grounds that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive actual
notice of the government's intent to forfeit his property. See United States v. Dusenbery, 223
F.3d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 2000). The court refused to recompense Dusenbery because it concluded
that the government had provided him sufficient notice of the civil forfeiture proceedings by
sending a certified letter to his attention at the prison where he was incarcerated. Id. Further-
more, the court noted that regardless of notice, he could not be recompensed for property that
he "admitted that he purchased.., with proceeds from drug sales." Id. Understanding that his
admission precluded him from recovering under the theory that "one never acquires a property
right to drug proceeds," Dusenbery renewed his challenge of the forfeiture proceedings on the
basis that the government's use of certified mail did not constitute sufficient notice under the
Due Process Clause. Id. at 425 (quoting United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir.
1995)). The Supreme Court concluded that the government's use of "certified mail addressed to
[Dusenbery] at the correctional facility where he was incarcerated" satisfied due process
requirements under the Mullane test of reasonableness under the circumstances. Dusenbery v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 700 (2002).
The Supreme Court's holding has no bearing on the analysis presented in the Comment
since the Sixth Circuit reached its decision on the assumption that Dusenbery's due process
rights had been violated and his contention that he was not at the federal prison where the
Government allegedly sent him notice "because he had been transferred to a local jail to await
trial." Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 764.
46. Id.
47. Id. Dusenbery's property was forfeited chronologically as follows: (1) Oct. 19, 1990:
$18,672.74 and $80,141.93; (2) Apr. 20, 1992: a 1990 Oldsmobile Delta 88 convertible; (3) Apr.
28, 1992: a 1956 Corvette convertible; and (4) July 29, 1992: a cashier's check in the amount of
$20,754.23. Id.
48. Id. As previously mentioned, the personal property connected with Dusenbery's 1986
conviction is not at issue in this case. See supra note 45.
49. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 764.
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B. The District Court's Holding: Hearing on the Merits Constitutes a
Proper Remedy
The district court denied Dusenbery's Rule 41(e) motion, finding
that he had received proper notice, and that the government had
adhered to civil forfeiture administrative procedures. 0 Dusenbery
appealed, and the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for
an evidentiary hearing, stating that the record failed to demonstrate
that he had been provided sufficient notice of forfeiture.5" On re-
mand, the government filed documents with the district court indicat-
ing that Dusenbery "never received actual notice of the pending
forfeitures of his property" and submitted a motion for summary
judgment that "assumed insufficient notice," thus making the eviden-
tiary hearing unnecessary. 52 The district court then began a judicial
forfeiture proceeding, despite Dusenbery's objection that such a
proceeding was "barred by the five-year statute of limitations.
'5 3
After Dusenbery failed to rebut the government's showing of prob-
able cause, the district court entered a forfeiture judgment in favor of
the government.
5 4
C. The Sixth Circuit's Holding: Hearing on the Merits Constitutes a
Proper Remedy
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that a hearing on the merits is the proper remedy for a civil forfeiture
action in which the government violated due process by failing to
provide adequate notice and allowed the five-year statute of limita-
tions to run.55 In reaching this conclusion, the Dusenbery court
considered Boero, Clymore, and Marolf before ultimately adopting
the reasoning in Boero.56
In Dusenbery, the Sixth Circuit rejected the reasoning in Cly-
more and Marolf by stating that the statute of limitations has no
bearing under these circumstances because "the [g]overnment is not
50. Id.
51. Id. at 764-65.
52. Id. at 765.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 768.
56. Id. at 767-68.
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required to institute 'new' forfeiture proceedings."57  The Sixth
Circuit then stated that the ineffective notice should be treated as
voidable, not void, so that it has the effect of tolling the statute of
limitations.18 In other words, the Dusenbery court concluded that
because the government attempted to commence the civil forfeiture
proceeding within the statutory period, a decision on the merits
should not be barred simply because the interested party, namely
Dusenbery, was not placed on notice.
The Dusenbery court proffered four reasons for its decision.
First, the court stated that "[w]e fail to see the equity in allowing the
claimant more than he would have been accorded in the first place;
namely the fortuitous benefit of avoiding the forfeiture process
altogether."5 9 Second, the court noted that the government made an
effort to send notice of forfeiture to the defendant; thus, as an equita-
ble remedy, the case should be decided on its merits.6° Third, the
court observed that despite the fact that Dusenbery never received
actual notice of forfeiture, he was not "completely blindsided, be-
cause the property in question had obviously been out of his posses-
sion since the date of seizure. ' 61 Finally, the court cautioned that to
hold otherwise "might encourage some claimants with borderline
notices and nothing to lose.., to sit on their Rule 41(e) motions until
the five-year statute of limitations has run. ' 62
D. Judge Cole's Dissenting Opinion: Forfeiture Is Void and Further
Proceedings Are Time-Barred
Judge Cole dissented from the majority's decision in Dusenbery
on three grounds. First, Judge Cole argued that there is "no reason to
determine the merits of a challenged forfeiture when the original
notice was constitutionally defective and the statute of limitations has
run" because "[i]nadequate notice is void. '63 Second, he asserted that
"there is simply no reason to disregard the statute of limitations"
because there are safeguards in place, specifically "the application of
57. Id. at 768. Apparently, had the Dusenbery court categorized the forfeiture proceedings
conducted after the statute of limitations had passed as "new," then these proceedings would
have been time-barred. See id.
58. Id.




63. Id. at 769 (Cole, J., dissenting).
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laches or equitable tolling," to prevent the "scenario the majority
fears" in which "a claimant receives borderline notice and sits on a
Rule 41(e) motion until the five-year statute of limitations has run." 64
Finally, Judge Cole urged that "due process protections ought to be
diligently enforced, and by no means relaxed, where a party seeks the
traditionally disfavored remedy of [civil] forfeiture. '65
III. THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE
GRANTED CERTIORARI AND REVERSED DUSENBERY BY ADOPTING
JUDGE COLE'S DISSENTING OPINION
Based on a fair reading of Boero, Clymore, and Marolf, it is ap-
parent that Dusenbery was incorrectly decided; the Sixth Circuit
should have adopted Judge Cole's dissenting opinion. Realizing that
the circuits do not agree on the proper remedy for civil forfeiture
cases where improper notice and the expiration of the statute of
limitations are at issue, Dusenbery was an appropriate case for the
Supreme Court to adjudicate. The Court should have granted
Dusenbery's petition for writ of certiorari and reversed the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Dusenbery because the reasons the majority cites
to buttress its holding have no foundation in the law.
First, the majority stated that dismissing the civil forfeiture pro-
ceeding would have allowed Dusenbery to avoid the "forfeiture
process altogether," which is more than a Rule 41(e) motion affords
claimants.66 While this logic at first seems appealing, upon further
inspection, it may compromise the due process rights guaranteed by
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 67
Specifically, the majority's holding allows the government to forfeit
property related to illegal drug activity under 21 U.S.C. § 881, and
then disregards the most significant statutory protections, notice and
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Clymore v. United States, 164 F.3d 569, 574 (10th Cir. 1999).
66. Id. A claimant who, like Dusenbery, files a Rule 41(e) motion for the return of
property, is given the right to a judicial hearing in "the district court for the district in which the
property was seized" to determine if "such person is entitled to lawful possession of the
property" in question. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 698 (2002).
Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, if the evidence indicates that the government had probable cause to
forfeit the property, and the claimant is unable to establish a defense by showing that either (1)
the property is not related to illegal drug activity or (2) they are "innocent owners," then the
forfeiture stands. These are not universal defenses to all civil forfeiture statutes. See Pimentel,
supra note 2, at 11 ("[t]here are many other statutes that provide for forfeiture as a criminal
penalty or as a remedy available 'upon conviction' of a crime").
67. See Noya, supra note 6, at 494.
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the statute of limitations, once the forfeiture is challenged. There-
fore, the government is able to use Congress' power to take an
individual's property, and then completely ignore the statute once
possession of the property is perfected. Not only is this likely con-
trary to Congress' intent, but also likely violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which "guarantees that '[n]o person
shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. ' '6s
Second, the fact that "this is not a situation where the govern-
ment never bothered to send notices of forfeiture '69 is irrelevant
because, in its motion for summary judgment, the government
conceded that Dusenbery received "insufficient notice" of its intent
to forfeit his property.70 While it is true that the government does not
need to provide the defendant or his attorney with actual notice of its
intent to forfeit, due process demands that notice be, at a minimum,
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections."7' Here, the government's
attempt to provide notice to Dusenbery was not reasonably calcu-
lated under the circumstances because the government allegedly sent
notice of the pending action to Dusenbery's prison cell during a time
when "he had been transferred to a local jail to await trial." 72 Fur-
thermore, there is no doubt that "notice could have easily been given
to him,"73 as the government subsequently never attempted to contact
Dusenbery, despite the fact that he had been incarcerated since 1986,
including when he filed his Rule 41(e) motion, and had been in the
government's custody during each of the administrative forfeitures.74
Since "[t]he forfeiture statutes 'imjose no duty on a defendant to
prevent the government from losing its rights through carelessness,"'75
68. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48 (1993).
69. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 768.
70. Id. at 765.
71. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 122 S. Ct. 694, 700 (2002) (citing Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 309-10 (1950)).
72. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 764.
73. See Boero v. DEA, 111 F.3d 301, 307 (2d Cir. 1997). Like Dusenbery, Boero was also
"a prisoner in custody, having been transferred to his place of incarceration directly from a
federal facility, and notice could have been easily given to him." Id.
74. Id.
75. United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Giovanelli, 998 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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there is no justification in further punishing76 Dusenbery by taking his
property when the government erred by failing to take reasonable
measures to ensure that he received adequate notice and letting the
statute of limitations run. Further, as Judge Cole astutely noted in his
dissent, "[i]nadequate notice is void and constitutionally defective. '77
Third, the fact that Dusenbery was not "completely blindsided"
78
by the forfeiture of his property is also of no consequence. It may be
true that Dusenbery was not surprised to learn his property had been
forfeited; nevertheless, the majority's holding denied him of his
constitutional right to be "informed that the matter is pending" so
that he could "choose for himself whether to appear, default, acqui-
esce, or contest. ' 79 As the Supreme Court recently noted, such notice
is of paramount importance "to protect [an individual's] use and
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken deprivations of property." 80
Fourth, the majority's concern that to hold otherwise "might en-
courage some claimants with borderline notices and nothing to
lose ... to sit on their Rule 41(e) motions until the five-year statute of
limitations has run"81 has no basis in the law. Specifically, as Judge
Cole observed in his dissent,82 should a claimant postpone filing a
Rule 41(e) motion until after the statute of limitations has expired,
the merits of the case will still be tried if the government "assert[s] the
affirmative defense of laches," or if the court chooses to "equitably
toll a statute of limitations in the interest of justice. '83 Consequently,
76. Civil forfeiture, like all civil penalties, "may constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes if it is not remedial in nature, but serves 'only as a deterrent or retribution."' United
States v. Volanty, 79 F.3d 86, 89 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
449 (1989)). Such an argument finds support in the Eleventh Circuit's comment that "[t]he
purpose of Section 881(a)(6) is to deter drug smuggling by depriving drug traffickers of the
fruits of their labor-money and property acquired with drug proceeds." United States v. A
Single Family Residence located at 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625,631 (11th Cir. 1986). This
was not at issue in Dusenbery.
77. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 769.
78. Id. at 768.
79. United States v. Woodall, 12 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
80. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (quoting
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-81 (1972)).
81. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 768.
82. Id. at 769 (Cole, J., dissenting).
83. United States v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1218 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999). The Marolf court
explained that "[t]o assert the affirmative defense of laches, the party seeking immunity from
suit must demonstrate that: (A) the opposing party inexcusably delayed the pursuit of its claim
and (B) prejudice resulted from this delay. Id. at 1218. A court may equitably toll the statute of
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if a defendant were to intentionally delay filing a Rule 41(e) motion,
despite the grim picture the majority paints, it is highly unlikely that
such a claimant would be successful in "avoiding the forfeiture
process altogether."
Finally, the majority's holding is inequitable, as it has the practi-
cal effect of tolling the statute of limitations in civil forfeiture cases
where property owners do not receive adequate notice. There is no
reason to grant the government this procedural advantage, realizing
that the government need only establish probable cause to carry its
burden of proof in civil forfeiture cases, and has sufficient time, five
years, to bring such cases. Additionally, the Dusenbery decision may
have the practical effect of encouraging the government to negligently
file civil forfeiture claims, since under the majority's holding, there is
no real penalty for failing to follow the procedures promulgated in
the civil forfeiture statutes. Further, as Judge Cole warned in his
dissent, courts should be wary of expanding the government's power
under these statutes, "for they impose 'quasi-criminal' penalties
without affording property owners all of the procedural protections
afforded to criminal defendants. '85
CONCLUSION
Because Judge Cole's dissent succinctly presents a balanced,
logical solution for the treatment of civil forfeiture cases where the
defendant was not afforded adequate notice of an administrative
proceeding, and the statute of limitations for filing a judicial forfei-
ture has expired, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari,
adopted his reasoning, and settled the current disagreement among
the circuits. Instead, by denying Dusenbery's petition for writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court not only failed its responsibility of
resolving circuit splits,86 but also did nothing to prevent constitutional
principles from being compromised, 87 or to ensure that civil forfei-
limitations "when (1) the defendant misleads the plaintiff into allowing the statutory period to
expire ... or (2) extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control make it impossible
for him to file suit on time." Id. at 1218 n.3.
84. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d at 768.
85. Id. at 769 (Cole, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 766 ("Few circuits have addressed this issue, and those that have are divided.").
87. See Noya, supra note 6, at 494.
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tures are "enforced only when within both the letter and the spirit of
the law." 88
88. Marolf, 173 F.3d at 1217 (citing United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 De Luxe
Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939)).
